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A8STRACT
This paper presents a computablegeneral equilibrium model that
simulates the effects on employment,output, wages, and economic efficiency of
introducing comparable worth into the U.S.economy. The model calculates
economy-wide aggregate impacts and disaggregated results forindividuals
grouped by sex, marital status, and education.
The effects depend on the hiring rulesthat would accompany comparable
worth, the source of existing male-female
wage differentials, the extent of
coverage of comparable worth, the intra-household behavior ofmarried couples,
and demand and supply elasticities.
If, after comparable worth is introduced,
employers are constrained to employ men andwomen in historical proportions,
the adverse effects on
aggregate employment, output, and efficiency would be
much larger than if the employmentconstraint is based on applicantpropor-
tions. If existing wage gaps are the resultof sex differences in productiv-
ity, the adverse effects of comparable worth
are relatively large; but if they
arethe result of discrimination, theefficiency losses are muchsmaller. If
onlypartof the economy is subject tocomparable worth, the efficiency loss
is reduced under the productivitygap assumption, but increased if the wage
gap is the result of discrimination.
The redistributive effects ofcomparable worth on married men and women
are sensitive to assumptions about intra-householdbehavior and the size of
thegains from marriage. By contrast, unmarriedwomen appear to benefit from
comparable worth under most sets of assumptions whileunmarried men lose.
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The l960s were a period of significant
changes in public policy with
respect to gender issues in the labor market. In 1963
the Equal Pay Act
outlawed separate pay scales formen and women performing similarjobs, and
Title 1111 of the 1964 Civil Rights Actprohibited all forms of discrimination
in employment. Despite these laws thewomen/men wage ratio in 1979 showed
little change from the level of about .6that prevailed prior to the anti-
discrimination legislation. Between 1979 and1983 the ratio advanced five
percentage points, but even after that gain the
average hourly earnings of men
were about 50 percent above those ofwomen of comparable age race, and
education.Moreover, a sharp increase in thepercent of women not married (and
therefore not benefitting froma husband's higher income) and a relative
increasein women's financial
responsibil.ity for children tended to offset the
gains made by women in employment and relativewages (see Fuchs 1986).
Inrecent years numerous additionalchanges in public policy have been
advocated in order to help womeneconomically. They include affirmative action
programs,paid maternity leaves, subsidized daycareservices, and perhaps most
significantly, equal pay for work of "comparableworth" (U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights 1984). Advocates ofcomparable worth note that jobs held
primarily by women pay substantially lowerwages than jobs held primarily by
men, even when education and other attainments of the
women equal or exceed
those of the men. They claim thatjobs can be evaluated by objective standards
such as educational requirements and
degree of responsibility, and thatwages
should be set according to those standards.Numerous lawsuits have been
broughtunder this theory, and some state and localgovernments have adopted
thecomparable worth approach in principle. Neither thefederal government nor
any state has yet attempted to enforce a comparable worthstandard on the
private sector, but that is the goal ofmany supporters of women's rights.
IEconomists have not been slow to address theissue of comparable worth
(Livernash 1980). Attention has been directedto questions about the existence
and magnitude of occupationalsegregation and discrimination (Treiman and
Hartmann 1981), and the direct coststo employers of implementingcomparable
worth (Oi 1986; Remick 1984; Treiinan,Hartmann and Roos 1984). Severalpapers
set forth the theoretical case
against comparable worth (Killingsworth1985;
Fischel and Lazear 1986), whilesome defend it on theoretical grounds
(Bergmann 1985; Aldrich and Buchele 1986).
Largely missing from the debate arequantitative estimates of the
employment, efficiency, or distributionalconsequences of comparable worth
(however, see Johnson and Solon 1984; Sorensen1986). Economic theorysuggests
that administratively determinedwages are likely to be less efficient than
those set by the interplay of demandand supply. But will the loss besmall or
large? What about the redistribution5 that
would occur? Who would gain? Who
would lose? And by how much?
This paper presents a generalequilibrjwn model that makes possiblethe
calculation of the effects on
employment output, wages, and economic
efficiency of introducing comparable worthinto the U.S. economy. Weuse a
computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelrather than relying on inferences
from a theoretical model forseveral reasons. First, full implementationof
equal pay for women and men would
represent a very large discrete change from
the current situation. The usualmethod of theoretical analysisthrough
comparative statics is most applicable forsmall changes at the margin.
Second, the model, though highlyaggregated, does attempt to capture several
complex interrelationships that it would beextremely difficult to sort out,
t.n!lsri; e.g.. the multiple effects on different
industry sectors, types of
jobs, and kinds of households.1
Finally, the CCE approach is sufficiently
flexible to permit comparison ofresults under a variety ofassumptions
2Through simulations we estimate effects for theeconomy as a whole, and
separately by production sector and for individualsgrouped by sex, marital
status, and education. Wedonot attempt to estimate the extent of
discrimination (choosing rather to simulate theeffects under alternative
estimates), nor do we estimate the administrativecosts of implementing a
comparable worth policy. We do consider alternativehiring rules that would
probably accompany a comparable worthwage policy, we examine the effects of
introducing comparable worth into some sectors butnot others, and we study
the consequences of alternative
assumptions about utility maximization in
married households.
The next section provides a morecomplete discussion of the modeling
issues. Then we present the model--itselements, structure, and assumptions
The simulation results follow, withemphasis on how effects depend on various
policyrules, behavioral assumptions, andexogenous parameters. The final
section discusses the implications of theresults for public policy and for
future research.
The mode], presented in thispaper is highly aggregated and static. It is
only a rough approximation to the "real world," butwe believe that much can
be learned about comparable worth fromit. The process of model construction
forces a consideration of issues suchas hiring rules or the nature of the
utility function in married households that have oftenbeen ignored in
theoretical discussions. The generalequilibrium properties of the model
permit the investigation of the effects onemployment, output, and the like
after allowing for demand and supplyresponses to changes in relative prices
and wages. We hold no brief forany particular assumption or result, but we
believe that the simulations taken asa whole provide many useful insights
concerning the possible effects of comparable worth on the U.S.economy.
32. Modeling Issues
General equilibrium calculationsrequire a fully specified model of the
economy. Each conceivable specification necessarily reflectsdifferent
assumptionsconcerning the nature of economic behaviorand institutions. In
the context ofa controversial policy issue such ascomparable worth, it
should not be surprising that there islittle agreement concerning the
validity of certain critical assumptions. Weemphasize that computational
general equilibrium simulations cannot resolve such
disagreements. Rowever,
they do serve to clarify the links betweenassumptions and implications.
Accordingly, this section discusses several critical
modeling issues, and
thereby provides backgrouncj for theassumptions employed in section 4. The
reader should bear in mind that we donot mean to endorse any particular
assumption by including it in our analysis.
A. Pay Differentials
The object of comparable worth is tonarrow or eliminate male-femalepay
differentials. To model the effects of thispolicy one must adopt some view as
to why these differentials exist in the firstplace. This immediately embroils
us in controversy.
Classical economic analysis attributeswage gaps to productivity
differences. The sources of such differencesmay be quite subtle. For example,
if women are more likely to leave thelabor force (perhaps forchildbearing),
then firms may be reluctant to trainwomen for jobs that require specific
skills, and women would be reluctant to invest
in such training. Women might
then be forced to settle for lowerwages, commensurate with their expected net
marginal products. Under this view, women withstrong attachments to the labor
force are the victims of "statisticaldiscrimination"(Phelps 1972).
Alternatively,one might argue that wage gaps do not reflectdifferences in
4expected marginal products. This requires one to formulatean explicit theory
of discrimination which accounts for thepersistence of wage gaps and the
failure of classical equilibriating forces.
In his seminal work, Becker (1971)developed various theories of
discrimination based upon personal tastes. Under thisview, the employment of
certain individuals creates disutility foremployers, co-workers, suppliers of
capital, or consumers. In equilibrium, employerspay such workers their
marginal products, net of external effects. Thisgives rise to pay
differentials.
More recently, some analysts have devoted increasedattention to the
possibility that wage gaps are attributable to marketimperfections arising
from informational problems. One suchtheory has been dubbed the "invisibility
hypothesis" (Milgrom and Oster 1984). Under this viewemployers have private
information concerning the abilities of theiremployees. Promotion signals
competence; promotion of a woman signals exceptionalcompetence. Thus, an
employer may prefer not to promote a competentwoman in order to extract more
surplus associated with her employment.
Other authors have suggested models of
discriminatory hiring policies.
For example, Bulow and Summers (1985) haveargued that this phenomenon arises
naturallywhenever job terminations are used todiscipline workers for
shirking. In their model, men and women areequally productive, and therefore
must receive the same wage. However, since womenare assumed to be less averse
to nonmarket activity, the threatof terminations will fail to induce
satisfactory effort unless, in equilibrium, women havemore difficulty finding
new jobs once terminated.
-
Anotherset of theories envisions discrimination as theconsequence of
self-fulfilling prophecies (see, for example, section 4of Arrow 1971).
SUnder this view, low compensation and
poor employment prospects discourage
women from expending effort or acquiring essentialskills. Employers in turn
pay women less and withhold promotions because womenare less diligent or
skillful. These theories have aninteresting and important implication:
policies which force employers to treat men andwomen equally may alter
incentives for women, thereby causingwomen to perform on par with men. This
creates a new self-fulfilling prophecy in whichdiscrimination is nonexistent.
Unfortunately, these more recent models of discriminationdo not lend
themselves to a computational framework.
Equilibria in models withuncertainty
and private information tend to beextremely complex, and generally depend
upon underlying distributions about which we haveno information. When
attributing wage gaps to discrimination, we will thereforeadopt Becker's
framework. In particular, we willassume that discrimination arises from the
tastes of employers.
We acknowledge that this view is not
entirely satisfactory. Specifically,
if the preferences of employers areat all heterogeneous, it becomesvery
difficult to explain the persistence ofdiscrimination. Nondiscriminatory
firms clearly have lower costs ofproduction. In the short run (with fixed
capital and, consequently, decreasingmarginal returns to labor), such firms
will operate on a larger scale than their
discriminatory competitors. In the
long run, capital will flow to the lowercost firms and discriminatory
employers will disappear entirely. Even if the bulkof capitalists
discriminate as well, nondiscriminatorycapitalists will earn higher returns
and eventually dominate. Thus,wage gaps persist only if discriminatory firms
have monopsony power. Theories ofwage gaps based upon the preferences of
consumers or co-workers also encounter difficulties,in that long-run
equilibriuju would tend to entail someappropriate degree of segregation.
6Accordingly, Becker concluded that discriminatorypay differentials were
likely to be relatively transient.
One need not, however, take the restrictive viewthat Becker's
discrimination coefficients reflect only the innatepreferences of employers
or other groups. Rather, we prefer to think of thesecoefficients as stylized
analytic tools for introducing wage gaps which are unrelatedto productivity.
Various commentators have suggested that theadoption of comparable worth
may hasten the erosion of discrimination against women, ormay provide
incentives which lead to the elimination ofproductivity differences (see the
discussion of self-fulfilling prophecies above). Wewill briefly consider
policy effects under such scenarios by assuming that discrimination
coefficients or productivity differences changesystematically subsequent to
implementation
B. Household Behavior
It is important to recognize that comparableworth might have a different
impact on single individuals who are concernedonly with their ownmarket
opportunities than on married individuals who alsocare about the market
opportunitiesof their spouses. In order to shedlight on this and associated
issues we require an explicit model of householdbehavior.
One alternative, which we take as thestandard case, is to assume that
thehousehold acts asa single utility-maximizing agent. It is possible to
justifythis assumption in at least threeways. First, spouses may bargain
over possible actions. As long as bargaining always results inPareto-
efficient outcomes (a standard axiom incooperative game theory), the
household behaves as if it maximizes asingle utility function. Second, under
certain conditions, family members who are linkedto a household head through
operativeresource transfers will act to maximize the utility of the head
7(Becker 1974). Third, it may becustomary for the household head to act
effectively as a dictator.
There are, however, two significant drawbacksto modeling households in
this way. First, unless one adds additionalstructure it is impossible to
assess the effect of comparable worth on thewell-being of married women as
distinct from married men. Second, theadoption of comparable worth may alter
the balance of power in the hOusehold's
decision-making process, thereby
invalidating the practice of using the householdscurrent utility function
for policy simulations.
To address these issues, we considera second model of household behavior
which imposes more structureupon decision-making. Specifically, we assume
that spouses bargain over possibleactions, and that the outcome of this
processcorresponds to Nash's two-person bargaining solution(Nash 1950). This
implies that the household acts as ifit maximizes
(UM
-jJ*)C(jJ-
where is the utility of spouse i (i—My), u isthe utility associated with
spouse i'sthreatpoint (more on this below), and is aparameter reflecting
relative bargaining strengths. Nash derived thissolution concept from more
primitive axioms (he also imposed asyametry axiom, which effectively implies
that a —1/2).Other authors have since provided alternativeJustifications
based upon explicit models of thenegotiation process (Rubinstein 1982). The
Nash solution has previously been used ina wide range of applied contexts,
including the study of household decision-making (Kotlilcoff
and Spivak 1981,
Manser and Brown 1980, and McElroy andHomey 1981).
This franiework allows us to differentiatebetween the impact of
comparable worth on individual spouses. However, itsimplementation requires
8us to specify the parameter .*,andthe threat points, U. Throughout our
analysis we assume that—1/2.Essentially, this implies that husbands and
wives are equally skilled at bargaining. It isdoubtful that our results
(which concern the effects of policy changes)are highly dependent upon the
value of a (which determines levels ofwell-being). On the other hand one
might argue that a would change in response tocomparable worth policies- •as
women become more successEul in the labor market,they may also become more
effective negotiators. By ignoring this possibleeffect, we may understate the
desirability of comparable worth to married women.
Conceptually spouses' threat points correspond to attainableutility
when negotiations are abandoned. It is naturalto think of this outcome as
divorce. Household decisions, therefore,ought to depend both upon the
economic opportunities available to single individuals2and upon the costs of
divorce. We identify two polar cases. In the firstcase, divorce is costless.
Spouses' threat points then correspond to the levels ofeconomic well-being
which they could obtain as single individuals.Marriage alters economic well-
being only to the extent it generates a surplus(perhaps through economies of
scale in production): spouses bargainover the division of this surplus. In
the second case, divorce isprohibitively costly, possibly because of
emotional stress, loss of "marriage-specificcapital." and/or social stigma.
Economic status subsequent to marital dissolution isthen of negligible
importance in determining the allocation of resources withina marriage.
The specification of threat points turns outto be a critical modeling
choice. When divorce is costless, a rise in women'swages necessarily benefits
married women, since their threat points improve. Thisremains true even if
men's wages fall simultaneously, as long as theeconomic surplus associated
with marriage does not shrink too much.However, when the costs of divorce are
prohibitive, a rise in women's wages may hurt marriedwomen and benefit
9married men- Indeed, this paradoxical result isquite likely to hold when
women's wages rise and men's wages fall byroughly the same absolute amounts.
We illustrate this possibility in Figure 1.Suppose that the threat
points are always given by 4
— — 0(the consequences of divorce are
disastrous to both partners). Suppose further that,at initial wages, the
utility possibility frontier is P°. The pair (U, U),given by the tangency
of with a rectangular hyperbola,represents the Nash bargaining solution.
Now suppose the woman's wage rises and the man'sfalls. Maximum attainable
utility for the man is higher than before (the woman worksfull time at a
higher wage to support his leisure); for thewoman, it is smaller. Thus, the
utility possibility frontier rotates. Ifwage changes are such that it rotates
around the initial solution (to P1), then thenew solution necessarily
involves higher utility for the man and lowerutility for the woman.
Intuitively, this change raises the cost ofproviding utility (through
leisure) to the woman and lowers the cost ofproviding utility to the man. The
woman is worse off because she is compelled to increaseher share of the
family's market work.
C.Implementation
Some practical difficulties involved in theimplementation of comparable
worth have been widely discussed (see, forexample, Raisian, Ward, and Welch
1985). First among these is the determination ofan appropriate index of
"Worth' from a large set of relevant factors,
including necessary
qualifications, responsibilities, working conditions, andflexibility of
hours. Second, there is the problem ofenforcement: a conglomerate might, for
example, circumvent a requirement that itpay truck drivers and textile
workers equally by divesting itself of eitherfirm. We abstract from these









UF UF Uconsideration is precisely defined and enforceable.We do, however, examine
two other implementation issues, the firstbeing the choice of a standard for
fair hiring practices.
Some such standard is clearly
necessary, since employers might otherwise
attempt to circumvent comparable worth by hiringmen exclusively.
Discriminatory hiring practices are indeed prohibitedunder current laws; the
issue is how these laws will be interpreted
to identify firms engaged in such
discrimination. While one could envisionan enormous spectrum of possible
standards, we will focus on two standards which
seem particularly natural.
First, courts might Judge a firm in violationof the law if it hired men and
women in proportions which were significantlyat variance with application
ratios. We will refer to this as the
applicant hiring rule. Second, courts
might prevent firms from lowering the fraction ofwomen hired in each
occupation subsequent to adoption of the policy. Wewill refer to this as the
'historical hiring rule." Wesuspect that courts' interpretations of statutes
prohibiting discriminatory hiring practices willcorrespond more closely to
the applicant hiring rule, and thereforeadopt it as part of our standard
case. We consider the results of the historicalhiring rule primarily to
illustrate that the effects of comparable
worth are extremely sensitive to
this aspect of implementation.
The second implementation issuewe address is whether comparable worth
standards, if adopted, would apply to the entireeconomy, or some significant
subset of industries. Pressure for remedial
legislation might, for example, be
concentrated primarily in the government andmanufacturing sectors. Indeed,
some states have already moved to adopt standards ofcomparable worth for
government employees. It is therefore important to considercases in which the
wage policy covers the entire economy ("full"implementation), as well as
12cases in which it applies to a limited number of sectors ("partial:'
implementation).
The potential importance of implementation issuescan be illustrated by
examining efficiency effects within a simple partial equilibriumsetting. In
Figure 2 we exhibit a standard supply and demand curve for somegood, X, which
the reader may interpret as female labor. In the absence ofgovernment
intervention, the price of X equilibrates at and agents trade the amount
X'. Now supposethat thegovernment artificially imposes a price floor,Pf
(set equal to the comparable male wage). Since the short side ofthe market
ordinarily determines exchange, agents will trade the amountXf. However,
suppliers will wish to sell X -- (X-Xf)represents unemployment.
The deadweight loss associated with this policydepends on the allocation
of demand among suppliers. Firstsuppose that the allocation is efficient, in
the sense that the lowest cost units aresupplied first (e.g., because
suppliers can freely trade the rights to sell units ofoutput). Deadweight
loss (DWL), which equals the sum of foregoneconsumer and producer surplus, is
given by the area of the shaded triangle. Simple algebra reveals that
p _p* 2 DVL i() (P*X*)C(l+c/c), 2 DD S
where 6D and are the elasticities of demand and supply, respectively. This
formula bears a strong resemblance to the standardcomputation for excise
taxes. The first two terms are, of course, thesquare of the price markup, and
expenditures on I. In addition, note that DVI. rises withCD just as it does
for an excise tax. However, note that DWL falls with,insharp contrast
with standard results on taxation. The intuition is, however, clear:since
suppliers are rationed, C does not affect Xf. A higher elasticity, therefore,
simply reduces the producer surplus associated with the foregone units.
13Figure 2










xfAlternatively, if rationing is completely random (as it is in our
experiments), some higher-cost suppliers participate in the market.Assuming
for simplicity a linear supply curve with intercept P. theaverage cost of
production for selected suppliers increases to (Pf +P)/2.Thus, the
deadweight loss associated with inefficient rationing is given by the shaded
area in Figure 3. One should add this to our DWL measure, above.
From this simple analysis, we can draw two important lessons.First, any
factors which dampen the demand responsemay reduce the distortions associated
with comparable worth. Thus, hiring quotasmay be a good second-best policy,
and quotas which lead to greater demand for women (such as theapplicant
hiring rule) may be preferable. Likewise, it may be desirable toimplement
comparable worth on an economy-wide basis rather than partially, in orderto
reduce shifts of demand away from covered sectors. Second, note thatthe
elasticity of labor supply is high whenever there are other profitableways of
employinglabor. Thus, in contrast to our last remark, partialimplementation
may be preferable to full implementation, since uncovered sectors can absorb
displacedworkers; this argument is strengthened if the rationing is
inefficient.
Inthe preceding discussion, we have implicitly assumed thatpurchasers
do not discriminate against X. If discrimination ispresent, then the true
marginalsocial benefit (laB) of using X at any level ofoutput is greater
thanthe price at which consumers would just be willing topurchase that level
of output. As shown in Figure4, thisincreases the deadweight loss associated
withimposing a price floor by an amount equal to the area of the shaded
rectangle. Thus, inthepresence of discrimination, itbecomeseven more



















17Economists have long been aware that partial equilibrium analysismay be
very misleading (see Harberger's (1961] seminal analysis of the corporate income
tax). The reader may be struck by the similarity between a partial factor tax
and a price floor on one factor input, especially when this floorapplies only
to employment in certain sectors. This analogy calls into question the
robustness of conclusions based on partial equilibrium analysis, and
underscores the importance of conducting general equilibrium simulations.
3. Model Description
To describe the implementation of our comparable worth experiments,we
turn to the specific structure and features of the model. This section details
the set of economic actors, the behavioral specifications, the alternative
assumptions concerning the initial wage gaps, and finally the meaning of
'labor market equilibrium" undercomparableworth. A full technical
description of the behavioral specifications is given in Appendix A, andour
benchmark data set is provided in Appendix 5.
A. Elements of the Model
As with all other computable general equilibrium analyses, weemploy a
highlyaggregated framework. Our simplified U.S.economycontains five
production sectors (each comprising one "representative' price-taking firm),
one government, and eight representative households. There are four jobtypes:
'high-skillmale-dominated," "low-skill male-dominated," "high-skill female-
dominated," and "low-skill female-dominated." Each occupationalcategory from
the 1979 Census is placed in one of these four aggregatesaccording to the
majority sex of its workers and their median educational attainment (with 14
or more years of school used as the definition of "high-skill').3 Our job
18definitions lead naturally to the specification of eight household types:
there are four representative married households, classified by the skill
levels of wife and husband, and four single types, defined by sex and skill
level. The five production sectors are agriculture, goods (including
manufacturing), trade and services, real estate, and government enterprises.
The inclusion of only four jobs, leading to just two wages under economy-
wide comparable worth,4 is a simplification imposed by computational
requirements. More disaggregation of jobs would be desirable but itisnot
clear a priori that the estimated effects of comparable worth on efficiency
are biased in a systematic direction. On the one hand, with a dichotomous
skill, level as the only dimension of "worth," the model overstates the extent
of the restrictions on wage rates. On the other hand, actual employers would
have more opportunities for substitution among the more numerous and narrowly-
defined jobs, and it is these opportunities that produce efficiency losses to
the economy.
Additional production sectors would not be a major computational burden;
the motivation for parsimony here was data limitations. Given that the
relative sectoral effects were not our primary interest, we sought to avoid
increasing the number of required production function parameters. Preliminary
analysis with a 20-sector model suggested that the macro and gender-related
effects are probably not sensitive to the number of sectors.
Thetransactions between economic agents are as follows. Household;
purchase the outputs of the five sectors, and providecapital services and the
fourtypes of labor to these sectors plus government. The household objective
is to maximize the utility obtained from leisure and consumption. Producers
combinethe factor supplies with intermediate inputs purchased from other
sectors, so as to maximize profits from the sale of output to other fins,
householdconsumers, and thegovernment. Finally, the government produces
19public services using labor and goods purchased with revenues from household
income taxes; the scenarios reported below are wequalyield experiments" in
which the marginal tax rates are adjusted so as to maintain constant real
government output.5
We turn next to the functional specifications that drive these
interactions.
B. Behavioral Specifications
The responses of firms and the government to changes in market
conditions are determined in accordance with their respective production
functions. As illustrated in Figure 5, we assume a nested-CES functionfor
value-added. In the innermost nests, composite high-skill and low-skilllabor
result from the hours supplied in the respective male- and female-dominated
jobs. At the next level, these composite labor inputs are combined with
capital to produce high- and low-skill value-added. The final CESstage
aggregates these into value-added, which is then combined with intermediate
goods in fixed proportions. The figure shows the substitution elasticities
used in our standard case, and also the initial shares of"high-skill capital"
that we assume in calibrating each sector's production function.
We also use a CES specification for utility in unmarried households;
here, the CES function combines composite consumption and leisure, where
leisure" is defined as the difference between a maximum possible workweek
and actual market work time. Composite consumption is a Cobb-Douglasaggregate
of the goods and services purchased from the five production sectors.7Note
that each "representative' worker spends some hours in both the male-and
female-dominated jobs at his or her skill level; thus "leisure" must also be
some kind of composite that reflects the worker's preferences for allocating
20Figure 5





































0.1 0.4 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.05
0.150.4 1.2 0.1 0.450.1
0.6 0.7 1.0 0.4 0.8 0.2
0.6 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.8 0.5
0.6 0.5 1.2 0.5 0.750.3
0.6 * 0.5 0.75time between the two jobs.8 We make two assumptions here: that the maximum
work week is divided between the two jobs in the same ratio as actual 1979
Census work hours for that type of worker;9 and that composite leisure is
again a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of leisure in each of the two jobs. Formally,




where T1 + —Ttot and —
Formarried couples, two alternative extensions of the single-person
formulationare included. Our standard case defines "household utility" as a
CES function of three terms- -household consumption, husband's leisure, and
wife's leisure (where each of these terms is again a composite). The merits
andlimitations of this representation were discussed in the previous section.
In our alternative Nash-bargaining formulation, husbands and wives have
distinct single-worker type utility functions, and agree to maximize the
product of their benefits from marriage. As a crude representation of the
various sources of benefits (e.g., economies of scale, love, children, etc.),
we include a single utility bonus factor "g" (>1), which increases the utility
of any combination of own consumption and leisure by a fixed percentage. The
spouses' threat points (or bargaining positions) are determined by the utility
they would attain if single, scaled by a term "T" (<1) representing the
psychic and/or financial costs of divorce. Using "U" to represent the utility
levels within the marriage, "V" to indicate the maximum attainable utility if




subjectto the household budget constraint.
The substitution elasticities used in the household utility functions are
derived from estimates of labor supply elasticities. The supply assumptions
and resulting substitution elasticities for our standard case are given in
Table I. The income elasticity of labor supply is directly determined by the
maximum work week parameter; in the standard set, we use 60 hours/week for
everyone, with implied income elasticities as shown in the table. Table 2
providesthe inalogous figures (along with the capital ownership assumptions)
for married couples in the Nash bargaining formulation, under our base
assumptions g —1.2and t— 1.0(i.e., a 20 percent utility bonus and costless
divorce10).
C. Wage Gap Assumptions
Accordingto Census data, women's wages in the four jobs are 18 percent
to 39 percent below men's wages;11 we assume that employers consider the sexes
perfectsubstitutes in each job at the given wages)2 As discussed above,
these differentials can be explained in various ways; the model takes an
agnostic position, allowing any fraction of the within-Job gaps to be
attributed to Beckerian discriminatory preferences by employers,'3 with the
remainder specified as due to productivity differences between men and women.
Of course, the source of thewagegaps between the male- and female-dominated
Jobs plays a major role in the comparable worth controversy. Here, the model
is less flexible; we assume that these differences are solely the result of
the balance between profit-maximizing demands and utility-maximizing supplies.
Ifanything,this assumption understatesthe efficiency costs of comparable
worth: whatever the source oftheinter-Jobgaps, employers will shift away
23Table 1. standard household assumptions by household type.
Marrieds Singles
Male skill level/ High! High/ Low/Low/ High/ Low/
female skill level HighLow HighLow /
High Low
Assumed labor
supply elasticity 0.1 0.150.250.3 0.0 0.2 0.35 0.55
Resulting substi-
tution elasticity 572 .707 .843 1.011 .599 1.012 .785 .952
Labor income elas-
ticitya implied
by —60 -.644 -.711 -.588 -.750 -.583 -.654-.863 -1.070
aElasticity with respect to pta-tax money income.
Table 2. Assumptions for husbands and wives in the standard Nash
(g —1.2,r —1.0,Ttot —60)
case.
Skill level of
husband/wife High/High High/Low Low/High Low/Low
Share of house-
hold capital
ownership .6 .4 .7 .3 .5 .5 .6 .4
Assumed labor
supply
elasticity 0.0 0.35 0.0 0.55 0.2 0.35 0.2 0.55
Substitution




-.559-2.149-.628 -2.217 -.583-1.777- .837-2.624
Spouse-income
labor supply
elasticity -.005 -.057 -.004 -.329 -.025 -.017
.
-.037 -.340
24from the female-dominated jobs when their relative wages rise, and this shift
will have a greater output cost the more productive those workers are (i.e.,
the more the gaps are due to discrimination).14
The model also allows experiments in which initial efficiency gaps and/or
discrimination coefficients disappear subsequent to the enactment of
comparable worth. As explained above, such scenarios correspond to some recent
theories of wage differentials. For productivity increases, the further
question arises of whether these gains are at all costly to women workers
(e.g.,in terms of reduced energy available for nonmarket pursuits). Again, we
takean agnostic position: any perceived cost between 0 and 100 percent of
the efficiency gain is allowed in the model.
D.Constrained Equilibrium under Comparable Worth
Both within-job and between-job wage gaps are eliminated by the
comparable worth wage rule, which specifies that all women and men of the same
skill level be paid the same wage.15 Given our assumption that the sexes are
considered perfect substitutes at the initial within-job differentials,
employers will prefer to hire men at any unisex wages. As noted in the last
section, we impose one of two hiring constraints to represent existing equal-
opportunity statutes: in the historical hiring rule, employers must continue
to employ female and male labor in each of the four jobs in the same
proportions as they did before comparable worth; under the applicant
proportions rule, women and men must be hired in the ratios by which they come
seeking employment. Without some such hiring rule to prevent employers from
exchanging wage gaps for employment discrimination, the model would find a
very high-wage equilibrium in which the demand for labor wasreduced to a
level that could be supplied by men alone.
25Although firms are thus constrained in their responses within each job,
neither hiring rule affects their ability to substitute away from the female-
dominated jobs, at a time when those jobs are becoming more attractive to
workers;16 thus neither rule produces full equilibrium in the labor market.
The form of the imbalance may not be immediately clear: are wages high with
some female-job aspirants unable to find desired employment, or do low wages
prevent firms from finding enough male-job workers? The answer is the former;
nothing prevents employers from raising wages to attract enough labor of any
type, but an underemployed female-job worker has no comparable ability to bid
the wage down,sincefirms must pay the same in both jobs and a below-market
wage would cause them to lose all their male-job workers.
Therefore, both men and women will face employment constraints in the
female jobs, under either hiring rule, With the applicant proportions rule.
both sexes will face the same percentage constraint in these jobs, and both
will be fully employed (i.e., face no constraint) in the male jobs, by
construction. Under the historical rule, supply and demand sex-ratios will not
coincide, and thus one sex (almost certainty women) will be constrained in the
male jobs as well.
A worker facing a binding constraint on market hours in one job will
compensate according to his or her utility function- -inpart by working more
in the other job at that skill level (unless a binding constraint exists there
as well), and in part by accepting more-than-desired leisure, (Married
couples may also substitute more spousal work time.) Note that the model
imposes the same constraints on all workers, rather than identifying some as
completely unemployed under comparable worth, and others as able to work as
many hours as desired.17 We feel this is a reasonable representation, given
the trend toward shorter work weeks (prompted in part by the decline of full-
26time homemakers, who can be expected to become even rarer under comparable
worth).
The preceding describes the model implementation of economy-wide
comparable worth; however, the model also allows "partial coverage"
experiments in which the wage restrictions apply only to a subset of
employment sectors. When there are covered and uncovered sectors, we model the
rationing of the covered sector employment by a lottery; each worker is either
a 'winner or a "loser" in each of his or her two jobs, and calculates desired
hours accordingly. This all-or-nothing approach differs, but perhaps not
unrealistically,from our treatment ofunemployment under universal coverage.
Notethat with enoughofthe economy not covered, no unemploymentoccurs: the
lottery percentages adjust to clear the covered labor markets, and the
uncovered-sector wages adjust freely to clear the others.
In sunary. a complete specification of an experiment with this model
involves the selection of the wage rule (see footnote 15), hiring rule,
efficiency/discrimination proportions in the intra-job wage gaps, continuation
or disappearance of these two pay factors, utility formulation for couples,
and sectors covered. In each case, the model solves for the wages, capital
rental rate, equal-yield tax rate multiplier, and the relevant employment
constraints.
Amongthe modelts more important limitations is the absence of dynamics;
we donot study the transition costs to the comparable worth equilibrium. The
modelalso ignores possible effects on fertility or investment in physical or
humancapital;social and political changes that might result from comparable
worthare also largely outside thescope of thispaper.
274. Results
As is typical in research with computable general equilibrium models, we
calibrate our model to reproduce exactly a benchmark data set, and report the
counterfactual simulation results as changes from this base equilibrium.
Before proceeding to the results, it may be useful to take a brief look at the
benchmark labor market.
The first panel of Table 3 shows that slightly less than one-fourth of
employment hours are worked in jobs which we classify as high-skill, and that
the ratio at female to male wages in a particular job category ranges from 60
percent to 82 percent. Women get the lowest relative wage in the male
dominated high-skill category. The second panel in the table shows the
allocation of labor across sectors and the degree to which the labor force in
each sector is male or female. "Trade and ServiceC and "Goods" each account
for roughly 40 percent of total employment in the economy. Almost half of work
hours in Trade and Services are performed by women, but the fraction is only
onequarter in the Goods sector. Employment inthe "General Governmenr
sectoriseven more female intensive than in Trade and Services, with women's
hours accounting for S2 percent of the total. The third panel shows that
married women work slightly more total hours than single women, whereas
married men provide a much greater share of total hours than do single men.
Tables 4 through 10 display the results for four sets of different
specifications of the model and of comparable worth policy. Each set comprises
two experiments: one in which the existing wage differentials within jobs are
due to differences in productivity, and one where they are due to
discrimination. (We have computed intermediate cases where the wage
differential is due to some of each and the results closely approximate a





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 macro or aggregate results for percentage change in CNP and total work hours
and the change in a measure of economic efficiency, while Tables S through 10
contain the microeconomic impacts in terms of employment, welfare, and output.
Since it is difficult to explain the aggregate results without reference to
the underlying allocational changes, we discuss these tables as a group rather
than examining them sequentially. Our measure of efficiency is the traditional
sum across households of Hicksian equivalent variations, expressed as a
percentage of base CNP. This measure is strictly appropriate for a Benthamite
social welfare function and is the construction universally used to measure
costs in cost-benefit analyses.
As an arbitrarily chosen "standard case," we consider full (economy-wide)
comparable worth, accompanied by a rule that hiring must be proportional to
applicants, and with family behavior governed by a single utility function.
Table 4 indicates that the macro effects of such a policy depend considerably
on the cause of the existing wage differentials. Considering first the case
in which they are due to efficiency differences, GNP and total work hours are
predicted to fall by 3.5 percent and economic efficiency is found to decrease
by almost two percent of CNP. Besides the direct deadweight cost illustrated
in Figure 3, the loss in economic efficiency is increased by the tax wedge
between the value of leisure and the social marginal productivity of work;
with this tax wedge, any policy which reduces the market labor usage will tend
to lead to a welfare loss.
The changes in GNP and economic efficiency calculated for the standard
case with efficiency differences are large relative to the corresponding
figures for other policies that have been explored with this type of model.
For example, Harberger (1966) and Fullerton, King, Shoven, and Whalley (1981)



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 income (at both the corporate and personal levels) is roughly between half and
one percent of GNP. Here, the efficiency cost figure is at least double that.
It should be pointed out that the loss in economic efficiency in this case is
not 1.96 percent of one year's GNP, but is equivalent to the annual loss of
that percent of the value of output- -i.e., a loss of roughly two percent of
thetotal human and nonhuman capital in the economy.
Ifthe wage gaps are due to discrimination,the CNPloss incurred with
the introduction of comparable worth in our standard case is 1.5 percent and
the loss in economic efficiency is just .24 percent. To understand why the
macro results are so different, one must refer to Table S which shows that in
both cases the composition of the labor force is significantly altered by
comparable worth: women's labor supply increases roughly S to 11 percent and
men's decreases about 10.5 percent. If women are as productive as men, as in
the case where the wage gaps are due to discrimination, this substitution of
women for men in the work force does not reduce GNP and efficiency as itwould
if the initial gaps were due to efficiency differences.
Onemightwonder why the discrimination gaps case does not show a
significantincrease in economic efficiency. The answer is that eliminating
thediscriminatory wage differentials does not nullify the employers' taste
for discrimination. Firms now consider women more costly than men, and while
they must obey the hiring rule in employing the sexes within each lob, nothing
prevents a demand shift away from those Jobs and sectors that are female-
intensive.'8 (This is equally true in the efficiency gaps cases.) Thus, the
perceptionof a wage "gap" is not eliminated, but transferred from the supply
side to the demand side; under the assumptions of our standard case, this
leaveseconomic welfare largely unaffected.
The expected patterns of employment changes are found in the micro











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 the female dominated jobs in the standard case. Table 10 shows that the
output of the Trade and Services sector, whose employees are almost half
women, declines by the Largest amount, significantly more than the other large
employment sector, the Goods sector. A result of the comparable worth wages
and the accompanying hiring rules is that single women, who desire to work
more at their newly higher wages, actually end up working less. They are
crowded out of employment by the very large increase in desired employment by
married women. In the standard cases, single women end up supplying 11 to 13
percent less labor <Table 5), although they would like to work about 25
percent more hours than are made available by employers (Table 7).
Focusing further on the effects of the employment constraints, we now
examine the results under the rule that hiring must be done in historical sex
ratios. Table 4 shows that the loss in GNP, work hours, and economic efficien-
cy would be significantly, and in most cases dramatically, larger than if an
applicant rule were applied, under either explanation of the existing wage
differentials. With historical hiring proportions, the labor demand for women
is much lower. As before, the sectors and jobs which heavily utilize women's
labor are those which shrink due to the increased cost of female labor.
However, in this case women cannot increase their share of the work in other
jobs, and therefore they are trapped in declining jobs and sectors and suffer
significantunemploymentThe later tables clarifythis. Table 5shows that
thegendercomposition of the labor force is quite different with the histori-
cal ratio hiring rule. Both men and women work less with comparable worth
under this regime, with the hours of single women now down about 20 percent.
The toss in GNP is particularly great in the discrimination gaps case relative
to what it would be with an applicant rule, because the many women who are
unemployed in this case are as productive as their male counterparts.
39Tables 6 through 8 further elaborate the differences between the results
with an applicant hiring rule and a historical hiring rule. The first rows of
Table 6 show a large shift of women between female-dominated jobs and male
dominated jobs. For example, in the standard case with existing wage
differentials due to discrimination, female hours in the low-skill female-
dominated jobs decline by 10 percent while female hours in the male-dominated
low skill jobs increase by almost 60 percent. With the historical hiring rule,
this large increase in female employment in the low skill male dominated jobs
is missing. Tables 7 and 8 show employment relative to desired employment by
sex and marital, status and also by job. Desired employment is the amount
someone would choose to work if there were no constraints on that person or,
in the case of married individuals, on the spouse. Table 7 shows that men
actually work more than they would if the comparable worth wages were not
accompanied by employment constraints; this is accounted for by married men,
who try to compensate for the restrictions that prevent their wives from
working as much as desired. This is particularly striking in the cases with
the historical hiring rule, where Table 7 indicates that married women work
only slightly more than 50 percent of their intended hours, and married men
work almost 112 percent of their desired hours. Table 8 shows that women move
from constrained to unconstrained jobs in the applicant hiring rule case, but
thateffectively all jobs are constrained for them in the historical hiring
rule. 19
We conclude that as a hiring regulation to accompany a comparableworth
wagepolicy, the historical hiring rule is sharply inferior to the applicant
rule. This was evident in the aggregate results of Table 4 and also shows up
in the disaggregated welfare results of Table 9. Regardless of whether the
existing differentials are due to discrimination or efficiencydifferences,
all married couples are better off with an applicant rule than with a
40historical hiring rule, as are high-skill single women. Single men and low-
skill single women lose somewhat less with the historical hiring rule under
the efficiency gaps assumption although even they would prefer the applicant
rule under the discrimination gaps hypothesis. The reason that single men may
do better under the historical rule is that they are protected from increasing
competition from women in the male dominated jobs. Low-skill single women seek
fewer work hours than their married counterparts, and thus are relatively less
restricted by the absolute hour limits used with the historical hiring rule
than by the proportional limits of the standard cases (see note 17). This
less-burdensome constraint in the female job can be enough to compensate them
for the restriction on hours in the male Job.
Still concentrating on the specific welfare effects under the two
alternative hiring rules, one major result in Table 9 is that only single
women are madebetteroff with comparable worth. The magnitude of the changes
in welfare are considerable. With the applicant hiring rule, comparable worth
legislation increases the welfare of single women from 4.7 to 6.4 percent
whiledecreasing the welfare of single men roughly 4 to 8 percent. Married
couplesare almost always made worseoff because the improvement in the wife's
wage fails to overcome the deterioration of the husband's work situation.
Another notable feature of Table 9 is that high-skilled men, whether
married or single, do muchworsethan low-skilled men, under either hiring
rule. The same holds, less strongly, for single women.Thisis largely the
result of our elasticity assumptions: we allow employers to shift from the
female- to the male-dominated job more easily at the low-skill level than at
the high-skill level (i.e., a5> inFigure 5); and we assume lower labor
supply elasticities, hence less ability to substitute consumption for higher-
costleisure, for high-skill workers (see Table 1). This explanation is
41confirmed by a simulation not reported in the tables, in which these elasticity
assumptions were reversed in the standard efficiency differentials case; these
changes cut the high/low welfare effects gap to .3 percent for single men, and
more than reversed the single women's gap, with the high-skilled workers
benefiting 1.5 percent more than the low-skilled. (The welfare effects for
single men (and married couples) are not more completely reversed in this
experiment because switching the assumed labor supply elasticities is not
equivalent to switching the model's consumption/leisure substitution
elasticities: other variables from the base data set, such as capital income
and hours worked, influence the derived substitution elasticities.)
We also examine in Tables 4 through 10 a case where comparable worth wage
equality is enforced only in the Goods sector and in Government Enterprises
and General Government. The aggregate results of Table 4 show that the
efficiency loss almost equals the percentage decline in GNP for this case, in
sharp contrast to the results of the other cases. The reason for this is that
partial coverage opens a new sort of intersectoral inefficiency, namely that
the wage costs differ between the covered and uncovered sectors. The strong
output effects of this are shown in Table 10 where the Trade and Services
sector, which is both labor intensive and female labor intensive, now grows
rather than shrinks. Because there is an uncovered sector to absorb all those
who want to work (at the relatively low wages which prevail there), aggregate
employment falls very little in this case. Technically, then, there is no
unemployment with partial coverage.
Recall that our formulation of the partial coverage cases allows those
who get covered jobs to work as many hours as they choose, but rations access
to these jobs. The resulting specific welfare effects are shown on the third
set of rows in Table 9, with standard deviations given in parentheses. For
instance, for the efficiency gaps assumption, high-skill single women on
42average gain 3.46percent,but one standard deviation adds or subtracts 4.96
percentage points to that figure. Women who are unable to find any covered
sectoremploytnent are unambiguously worse off than if no comparable worth
policy existed.
The final case covered in the set of Tables 4 through 10 is not a variant
of our model of comparable worth, but rather an alternative model of the
family. Here we adopt the approach described above in which Nash bargaining
determines the division of resources in marriages. In the cases shown in this
set of tables, we assume the gains from marriage (perhaps due to economies of
scale in consumption) are 20 percent. In this Nash bargaining framework we are
able to examine the welfare consequences for husbands and wives separately.
The aggregate results of Table 4 are not too different in the Nash
bargaining case from those in the standard case, although under the efficiency
gaps assumption the percentage declines in ON? and aggregate welfare are now
noticeably smaller. This is because the composition of employment is very
different with Nash bargaining, as is evident in Table 5. Because of the
bargaining arrangement, much less substitution of women's work for men's work
takes place among marrieds. Overall, the labor force is more male intensive
with the Nash bargaining model, and since men are more productive in the
efficiency gaps case, GN? and total efficiency fall less. The specific welfare
results of Table 9 show separate compensating variation figures for husbands
and wives for the household bargaining mode].. In these cases, husbands lose
and wives gain. In fact, husbands lose more than single men of the same skill
level; this is because their threat points have weakened in their marriages
relative to those of their wives.
In any simulation model, the results are a function of assumptions and
parameters.This particular model is relativelycomplex and involves a large
numberof assumptions, prohibiting systematic sensitivity analysis. Nonethe-
43less we have examined the results of some alternative parameter values, and
present the results in Tables 11 and 12. Two variants of the standard case
with efficiency gaps are presented, one which raises the total hours to be
allocated between work and leisure from 60 hours a week to 70 hours per week
(with other parameters recalibrated so that the model still replicates the
benchmark data in the base case), and the other triples the intra-skill
elasticities of substitution (04 and G). Changing the total amount of time to
be allocated affects the qualitative results of comparable worth not at all
and the quantitative results only slightly. Tripling the substitution
elasticities is a rather more drastic change in assumptions and hence causes
some important qualitative changes in the results. Fins can now substitute
male dominated jobs for female dominated ones much more readily, with the
result that women are much more constrained in the amount of work offered them
after comparable worth is implemented. Total work hours by women now decline,
total work hours in the economy fall by over 7 percent and the decline in GNP
and economic efficiency is correspondingly higher than in the standard case.
Interestingly. Table 12 indicates that all households are worse off with the
higher substitution elasticities, with the exception that low-skill single
men are slightly better off. Of course, the high elasticities simply allow a
wedge to cause greater distortions in the economy, as was described above.
We also increased elasicities (in this case the labor supply elasticities
and all substitution elasticities in the Goods and trade and Services sectors)
in the standard case under the discrimination gaps hypothesis. Again, the
higher elasticities lead to larger welfare losses and a greater reduction in
labor market hours and GNP. The partial equilibrium analysis of section 2
predicted the opposite welfare result for the supply elasticities case;
however, that analysis took as given the wage floor Pf. Here, the greater




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 work force, and hence a higher average wage perceived by employers. The
qualitative result that the efficiency cost of comparable worth is much
smaller if the existing differentials are due to discrimination remains, with
the efficiency loss numbers remaining under one percent of CS? even in these
cases with increased elasticities.
We have done two sensitivity analyses for the Nash bargaining cases. In
the first of these, we set the threat points to zero for married couples in a
case where the existing differentials are due to efficiency differences.20
This effectively locks both spouses into the marriage and causes them to
engage in the same type of female for male labor substitution that is observed
with the model with family utility functions. In particular, Case 3A of Table
1.1 shows that married women work 14 percent more and married men 6.6 percent
less after comparable worth. This substitution was not apparent in the base
case where threat points were equal to a spouse's utility if single (i.e.,
with costless divorce). The most noticeable change caused by the removal of
threat points (which is analytically equivalent to an infinite marriage bonus)
is in the distribution of welfare within marriages. These figures are shown in
Table 12. With a 20 percent marriage bonus, wives gain and husbands lose due
to comparable worth; the womens gain arises from the strengthening of their
threat points. With zero threat points, the women work more and therefore
enjoy less leisure, while the husbands share in the income generated by the
wives. In fact, the husbands in some cases end up significantly better off
while all wives are worse off because of comparable worth. The second of the
Nash bargaining sensitivity cases increases the marriage bonus or the degree
of returns to scale in marriage from 20 percent to 50 percent, in a case where
the existing wage differentials are due to discrimination. This change barely
affects the aggregate results, although the labor substitution and the welfare
transfers noted above are also apparent for this case.
47In addition to the above experiments with various comparable worth
specifications and parameter choices, we have conducted a third group of
simulations in which the discrimination or effiency differences that produce
male/female wage gaps in each job evaporate. We summarize the macroeconomic
results here but omit the detailed tables, partly for brevity and partly
because we don't feel that our model adequately captures the complexities of
the labor market theories that predict this elimination.
Because discriminatory preferences affect the efficiency of resource use
atthe margin, while productivity gaps affect the value of all infra-marginal
resources, the disappearance of the former should provide smaller gains than
theeliminationof the latter. The model confirms this: if pre-existing
discrimination evaporates under comparableworth, GNP rises 2.2 percent and
overalleconomic efficiency is boosted 1.6 percent of original 01W; for
vanishing productivity differences, the corresponding gains are 5.3 percent
and 7.5 percent. Even here, of course, the equality of wages between male- and
female-dominated jobs imposed by comparable worth is inefficient; if
discrimination or productivity gaps could be eliminated without comparable
worth, the gain in economic efficiency would be 3.6 percent or 9.7 percent.
respectively. (These latter figures are our model's estimates of the welfare
costs of the intra-job wage differentials, under the two alternative
assumptionsconcerning their origin.)
We also considered cases in which productivity differences evaporate, but
atsomecost to women workers throuzjtincreased schooling, acceptanceof less-
preferred careers, a reduction in ener available for non-market activities,
or the like. If women bear the full cost, then eliminating the productivity
gaps leads to no change in economic welfare; in a smaller number of hours,
women can produce as much as they did before for exactly the sane total pay
48and at precisely the same disutility cost from working. If comparable worth
is added to this situation, an efficiency loss of 1.0 percent is observed.
Theseresultsare somewhat non-linear with respect to the "effort cost"
assumption; for example, to equate the welfare change under the assumption
that women bear a cost of 90 percent of the productivity improvement with a
weighted average of the "full cost" and "zero cost" results, respective
weights of about 93.5 percent and 6.5 percent are required.
S.Discussion
The simulations reported in this paper reveal that both the implementa-
tion of comparable worth and the analysis of its effects are extremely com-
plex.The results are very sensitive to assumptions about the hiring rules
that willaccompany the wage constraints and the source of existing male-
female wage differentials, the modeling of married households, and a number of
behavioral parameters.
Consider the issue of hiring rules. Regardless of whether existing wage
gaps are due to efficiency differences or to discrimination, the introduction
of comparable worth on a large scale will cause employers to want to substi-
tute away from women workers toward men. Thus some constraints on hiring are
likely to be imposed. If, after implementation of comparable worth, employers
are required to maintain the same sex ratio of employees as before the new
policy(historical proportions),theadverseeffects of the policy on employ-
ment, gross national product, and economic efficiency will be much greater
than if firms are required to employ men and women in the same proportion as
they appear in the pool of qualified applicants (applicant proportions).
Marital status and the assumptions about the nature of marriage are very
important. The effects of comparable worth on employment, income, and utility
of single men and women are relatively easy to discern: single women are big
49winners, although their employment falls. Single men are unambiguously big
losers. The effects on married men and women, by contrast, are not easy to
predict. They vary greatly depending on whether married couples are assumed to
have a single utility function or to engage in bargaining. If the latter, the
results are additionally sensitive to the ease or difficulty of divorce and
the size of the gains from marriage.
If existing wage gaps between men and women reflect efficiency
differences, comparable worth would have substantial adverse effects on
the economy as a whole, although women as a group might benefit, and single
women almost certainly would benefit under a variety of assumptions, If the
wage gaps are entirely attributable to discrimination, comparable worth would
have smaller effects on GNP. total employment and, particularly, aggregate
welfare. The simulation results based on assumptions of zero discrimination or
100 percent discrimination can be regarded as providing upper and lower bounds
of the effects of comparable worth within the limits of the model.
As might be expected, if comparable worth is introduced in only part of
the economy (partial coverage), the effects in most respects are attenuated;
however, if the wage gap is the result of discrimination, the efficiency
losses are greater than they would be with full coverage. Also in line with
expectations, the efficiency losses increase if employers' elasticities of
substitution are larger.
Regardless of assumptions, the redistributive effects of comparable worth
are likely to be substantial. Not only are men and women affected very differ-
ently, but there is an interaction between sex and marital status, and sex and
skill level. Those who oppose comparable worth because they expect it to have
adverse effects on aggregate economic well-being will find some support in
these results, but those who favor comparable worth because of its redistribu-
tive effects will also find support.
soThe work presentedhere needs to be extended in a variety of ways.
First, themodel could be made more realistic by introducing more jobs,
other wage-determining characteristicsin addition to education,and more
industrial sectorsand firms. Whether a more finely tuned comparable worth
policyimposed on a mare disaggregated model would result in larger or
smaller changes in CUP and economic efficiency is not clear a priori. The
policy rule in our model, complete equality in pay between men and women
(in the two types of jobs) is clearly an extreme version, and to that
extentexaggerates the impact of comparable worth. On the other hand, our
highly aggregated model understates the extent to which individual fins
and industries could react to comparable worth by reorganizing production
and substituting male for female labor. This reorganization and substitution
tendsto increase the efficiency losses. It is clear that greater disaggrega-
tion would tend to reduce the redistributive effects of comparable worth.
Second, a more detailed model, should consider the effects of evasion
(perhaps analogous to partial coverage), as welt as the costs of enforcement
designed to reduce evasion. In addition to outright defiance of the law
(especially by small fins where enforcement would be extremely expensive),
employerscould resort to greater reliance on 'temporary" labor, more
purchased inputs, and similar restructuring that would tend to distort the
effect of the comparable worth policy. These "quasi-legal' evasions would
reduce the redistributive impact of comparable worth and probably increase its
adverseeffect on efficiency.
Third,itwould be useful to analyze thetransitionto comparableworth.
Wage parity between women and men requires a steep rise in women's wages or a
steep fall in men's. The foner is likely to be more politically feasible;
therefore, if the policy were introduced all at once over the entire economy,
51the dynamic shock effects might be greater than those experienced when OPEC
raised the price of oil in 1973. Fourth, research is needed that considers
possiblelong-run effects of comparable worth onmarriage,divorce, fertility,
andeducationalattainment. All of these factors have been held constant in
the simulations. Finally, this study clearly exposes theneedfor more precise
understanding of intra-household behaviorin marriage,thesources of
existing wage gaps, and the demand and supply elasticities that help to
determine the effects of comparable worth.
52FOOTNOTES
I.Note that there is a striking similarity between implementing
comparable worth in some subset of economic sectors, and imposing a partial
factor tax on capital in the corporate sector (i.e., a corporate income tax).
Previous studies of the corporate income tax have not only revealed the
importance of general equilibrium effects (see Harberger 1961), but have also
demonstrated thevalueof modeling the economy in detail, and employing
computational techniques (see Fullerton. King, Shoven, and Whalley 1981). If
anything, the effects of comparable worth are more complex. For example, while
the interpretation of a tax wedge is unambiguous, one must consider several
possible sources for male-female pay differentials.
2.Ideally, the opportunities available after divorce should include
the possibility of remarriage. Such "marriage market interactions are not
considered in the present model, but are the subject of current study by the
first author.
3. other data sources include the 1977 Input-Output tables, the 1977
IRS tax tables, and the 1972-73 Consumer Expenditure Survey of the Department
of Labor. More recent CES data are now available, but our sectoral classifica-
tion is broad enough that updating the expenditure shares is unimportant.
4.We recognize that comparable worth would leave each firm freeto use
anyconception of worth that could be shown not to be sex-biased; we assume
within-skill-level wage equality across all employers covered by comparable
worth simply as a consequence of long-run competition.
5. To accommodate the Input-Output data, we also have a rudimentary
foreign sector: U.S.importsin the five production sectors and net capital
53exports are both fixed in quantity terms, and U.S. goods exports adjust (in a
given Cobb-Douglas pattern) to maintain aggregate balance.
6.Since econometric estimates of the precise parameters we need are
generally unavailable, we have had to rely heavily on our own best guesses.
The only recourse in such a situation is to conduct sensitivity tests, some of
which are reported below. The government is assumed not to use any capital.
This assumption was chosen due to a lack of available data on government
capital ownership and use, and because it was not felt that the specification
of the government production function had a central impact on our results.
7. Government spending does not enter explicitly into utility. Since
our experiments hold the size of government fixed, this simplification has no
effect on our conclusions. More generally, one could justify our approach by
assuming that utility is separable in privately and governmentally provided
goods.
8. Alternatively, we could have subdivided the households by the job as
wellasskill type of each worker. In this case, the model would require a
description of the willingness of people to transfer from one job (and hence
household category) to another, depending on wage and unemployment rates.
9.One should not interpret this assumption literally. It reflects an
abstract restriction on our functional specification, which generates
plausible behavioral responses. As discussed in the next section, our results
are not sensitive to the assumed length of the maximum work week.
10. Although the model does have separate g and tparameters,it can be
seen from the Nash formula that only their ratio has any significance.
11. In the original data, the average wage paid to a worker of a given
sex and job differs by employment sector. A number of factors may help explain
this, ranging from compensating worker preferences to disequilibrium in the
labor market, and almost certainly including differences by sector in the
54composition of our four aggregate wjobs._ We assume that the initial data do
reflect an equilibrium; and rather than define a vector to represent worker
tastes or employer requirements, we apply the economy-wide average wage to
each sector, and adjust the number of hours accordingly. In the latter case of
different equality mixes in different sectors, these adjusted figures can be
thought of as the efficiency hours demanded in each sector.
12. This assumption follows naturally from the assertion that men and
womenare performing the same job. Of course, the jobs are only the same at
the model's level of aggregation, since the sexes are distributed differently
amongthe many occupations within each of our four jobs. The model does
include imperfect substitutability between work hours in male- and female-
dominated jobs; again, a more disaggregated model would be able to better
approximate the correct substitution possibilities, but at high costs in
computer time and presentational complexity.
13. More precisely, since there is no identifiable class of business
managers in the model, we represent discrimination by capitalists, with the
discrimination income distributed to households in proportion to their
ownership of physical capital.
14. This conclusion needn't hold if comparable worth would eliminate the
propensity to discriminate against female jobs, but not affect existing
efficiency differences.
15. Two alternative wage rules of lesser interest are available: wages
can be equalized within each of the four jobs, butnotacross jobs in a skill
category; and wages within a skill, category can be equalized separately for
the two sexes.
16. High-skill women are an exception; since they are initially paid
slightly more in the female-dominated job (see Table 3), comparable worth
55makes that job sl.ightly less attractive to them in relative terms. However,
the higher real wages increase these women's desired employment in bothjobs.
17.Note that an absolute hour constraint (e.g.. 18.3 hours/week)may be
binding on workers from one household type but not others. This is thetype of
constraint used with the historical hiring rule. Because of the 'equal
proportions" nature of the applicant hiring rule, it is more natural to
formulatethose constraintsin percentage terms (e.g., 83 percent ofdesired
hours);clearly, this type is simultaneously binding on all workers. (The
obviousstrategic behavior is not allowed.)
18.Under the applicant hiring rule, the female- or male-intensity ofa
sector depends on where the sexes choose to apply for work. For a given job,
we assume that women and men distribute their applications in such away as to
increase (or decrease) the ratio of female to male hours workedby the same
percentage in each sector; i.e., we assume that the relative pattern of the
sectors' female-intensities will tend to persist under comparable worth.
19. In the first two rows of Table 8. the figures for the two female-
dominated jobs are the same for men and women; this is no coincidence, buta
direct result of the applicant hiring rule used in the standardcases. This
equality does not obtain under the historical hiring rule.
Although the Nash bargaining experiments reported at the bottom of the
table use the applicant proportions rule, women work aslightly smaller
fraction of their desired hours than do men in the constrainedjobs: the
explanation is that in these experiments, "desired employment hours" are not
identical with the requests for work actually presented toemployers. Desired
hours are calculated at the hypothetical resource allocation that wouldoccur
if there were no employment constraints, whereas applicationsseen by fins
depend on the actual income division between husbands and wives, taking the
constraints into account. Since the employment rationing in female-dominated
56jobs is more costly to wives, the Nash bargaining process partially compensates
for this by increasing their share of household resources over what it would
be with no constraints; this lowers the female labor supply seen by firms, who
continue to accept equal proportions of actual labor applications from women
and men.
20. We are unable to report an aggregate efficiency cost of comparable
worth in this case. Recall that our efficiency measure in the sum of Hicksian
equaivalent variations- -i.e.,the negative of the sum of the payments required
to make each individual as well off as before comparable worth. In the other
Nash bargaining experiments, it Is possible to bring both marital partners
back to their original utility levels by a suitable combination of payments to
(or from) each spouse; these payments affect not only the aggregate income of
the houshehold, but also the relative bargaining positions of the spouses.
However, in the "no divorce' case, the outside prospects of the husband and
wife are Irrelevant to the household bargaining, and giving more income to one
spouse or the other is equivalent to simply adding income to "the household.'
In general, and in our comparable worth experiment in particular, there is no
change in household income that will simultaneously restore the base utility
levels of both partners.
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60APPESDIX A
Technical Specification of Agents' Economic Behavior
1. Firms
Intra—industry competition ensures that production takes place only at
the cost—minimizing point along the efficient production frontier, given the
prevailing wages and capital rental rate. Thus the representative firm sees
its output price P and value—added price PVA as determined by the industry cost
function, and chooses inputs of male and female labor (M and F) and of capital
for high—skill and low—skill workers (1(14 and 1(L) to attain this least—cost
solution while satisfying product demand. Let job subscripts 1 and 2 refer to
the male— and female—dominated jobs, with 3 and 4 denoting the male and female
low—skill jobs; and let LH and LL refer to composite high— and low—skill labor,
respectively. Then the problem for sector i (i—l,5) can be stated as
4
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WM.,WF. =male,female wage rates (j=l,4)
D. psychic discrimination costs (j=l,4)
Q.= productdemand
E.= relativeefficiency of women to men (j=l,4)
=l/o.kl(lel,5), where is the substitution elasticity
ik =shareparameters (kl,5)
production intercept
under the historical hiring rule
and
under the applicant hiring rule,
where SF. and SM. are female and male labor supply,
and superscript o refers to the base data.





market forces produce WF. = — D.for j1,4. This latter relation leaves
employers indifferent between hiring women and men, and thus willing to accept
the sexes in the ratios they come seeking work. Therefore, the 'applicant
hiring rule" formula for V is also imposed, as a non—burdensome market—clearing
mechanism, in experiments without comparable worth, and on the uncovered
sectors in the partial coverage cases. In the latter cases, the labor supply
figures in the V formula distinguish between workers in thecovered and
uncovered labor markets; also, the wage rates differ by sector, but sectoral
subscripts are omitted here for clarity. The discrimination wages 5. areheld
roughly constant in real terms by indexing them to the male wagein job 1:
DWM1/WM. In text Figure 5, two substitutionelasticities are given
as 1.0; these are entered in the model as 1.001 to avoid degeneracy.
62Product demand is the sum of the demands for net exports, final
consumption by households and the government, and intermediate consumption by
other producers. Imports are fixed in reat terms; foreigners spend a part of
their dollar receipts on a fixed quantity of U.S. capital service exports,
and the rest on sectoral outputs in fixed (i.e., Cobb—Douglas) value shares.
Demand by the government and each household type is also allocated in fixed
value shares, and intermediate products are required in the same real proportions
as in the base input—output data. The output prices to which demands respond
are determined by the CES cost functions for value—added, augmented by the
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63where
a1Qi,Zth element of the proportional input—output matrix A
FD. =finaldemand
1
bhiIBCSEi =household,government, and export value shares(h=l,8)
Ch.CG =household,government consumption expenditures (h=l,S)
I>!. =imports(exogenous)
CAPEXPcapital exports (exogenous)
P.,PVA.output price, value—added price
and combined male—female perceived wagerate(j1,4).
2. The Government
The specification of governnent behavior differs from that of firms In
three ways: real output is exogenous and fixed, rather than demand—sensitive;
value—added is again combined with aggregate intermediate inputs, but this
aggregateishere a Cobb—Douglas composite; and no capital is used in producing
value—added. Thus, the government's optimization problem is
4
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with the same definitions as above.
64The price" of government production is relevant to the calculation of
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where is the intermediate inputs ratio and W. (j1,4) is the average
perceived wage in job jasdefined above.
3. Households
Households seek to maximize utility, which is a CES function of consumption
and leisure; these in turn are bath Cobb—Douglas aggregates. There are four
types of married households, defined by the skill levels of husband and wife,
and four types of single households, classified by sex and skill level. For
convenience, let s index the household's four (two, for singles) work
possibilities; the household type h determines the market job to which a given
$corresponds.(For example, by numbering convention, h3 refers to married
couples with a low—skilled husband and high—skilled wife, and s4 indicates
the wife's work in her female—dominated job; thus the household wage
corresponds to WF2——women's wage in the female high—skill jab——in the previous
notation.) Let denote household h's real consumption of good i, and
Th. L and
its (exogenous) available hours, actual work hours, and wage
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In both cases, the household faces a budget constraint and possible employment
constraints
VPC C(l_th2)EEwhsIhs + r(K.+DIb) —thi (l_th2)Yh —thi
L<LM.AX
hs hs
Here is incomefromexcess discrimination profits, distributed in proportion
to each household's (exogenous) capital ownership,
01h lD FjI)KfK.
The lump—sum tax rates thi are held roughly constant in real terms by pegging
0
them to a consumption price index: thl thl rI(P./P.) where .isthe
value share of good i in base household consumption. The marginal tax rates
th2 are scaled up or down as needed to maintain government budgetbalance:
th2 =t2(PGG_IPOPktkl)/ POPkYkt2*
66In comparable worth experiments, the values of t1andt2usedfor single
women's households (h=7,8) are not those from the base data set. Since this
wage policy would tend to move single women into the same tax brackets as
single men of the same skill level, in these experiments we apply the men's
base tax rates as the starting points for single households of both sexes.
Regrettably, the tax rates in the partial coverage experiments are not specific
to each worker's luck in the covered—sector employment "lottery." LMAXh
(i.e., there are no binding constraints) in experiments without comparable
worth, and in those with partial coverage. In the latter, access Co employ—
ment in the high—wage sectors is rationed by the eight lottery ratios, which
adjustto match the cemand forworkers ineachjob/sex combination; thus,
eachhousehold type is divided into sub—types (16 for married couples, 4 for
singles)with different combinations of covered and uncovered wages in the
budget constraint.
Withfull coverage of comparable worth, UIAXh depends on the hiring rule.
Under the applicant hiring rule, neither sex faces any constraints in the
male—dominated jobs (s—I or 3); in each of the two female jobs, all workers
are allowed to work the same fraction of hours they would have chosen in the
absence of any employment constraints; again, the two fractions are chosen to
match the levels of demand. Thus, each household optimization problem is
solved twice: once taking only the budget constraint into account, to calculate
"desired" hours, and the second time with the proportional limits imposed for
s2 and 4, to calculate the optimal adjustments in consumption and in hours
worked in the male jobs. With the historical hiring rule, desired hours have
no bearing on a household's LMAJL ; all workers in a given job are given the
same hour limit. This limit may not be a binding constraint inall households,
but it is set to restrict enough workers so as to equate constrained supply
with demand, given each sector's traditional sex ratio in that job. This
6?hiring rule produces unemployment of one sex (always women, in our experiments)
in the male—dominated jobs, as well as of men and women in the female jobs
(as with the applicant hiring rule).
Under the Nash bargaining formulation, married couples choose an income
transfer from one spouse to the other so as to maximize
(gU1 —rVhl)(gUh2 —tVh2)
where g =marriageutility bonus
I= divorcepenalty
Uhl.IJh2 =utilityof spouses 1,2 after income transfer
Vhl.Vh2 maximum attainable utility of spouses 1,2 as singles.
If and V are calculated as for a single household; V requires assumptions on the
spousal capital ownership shares and the tax brackets of each after divorce.
The former are shown in text Table 2; for the latter, we assume that a divorced
person would face the sane tax bracket as a currently—single person of the
same sex and skill level. (As noted above, only the skill level is relevant
in comparable worth experiments, because we equalize the two sexes' single—
household tax rates in those cases.)
68APPENDIX B
Benchmark Data Set
As noted inthe text, a benchmark economic equilibrium is used as the
starting point for our comparable worth experiments. This appendix provides
the complete reference data set and some brief comments on its derivation.
The two most important sources of data for our benchmark equilibrium are
the 1977 Input-Output tables given in the U.S.Departmentof Commerce Surv
of Current ausiness for May 1984, and the 1979 Census of Population 1/1000 (A)
Public Use Sample. We aggregated the finer classifications of the I/O tables
to obtain our five-sector figures for the flows of goods (except to household
consumers) and payments to production factors, and sorted the Census data by
the model's household and job types to derive initial figures for household
characteristics and wage and employment patterns by job. The only Census data
excluded from consideration were those for people under 18 or in
institutions; non-workers were assigned a skill level on the basis of their
owncompletedschooling, rather than by the median educational attainment in
some occupation. Other sources included the 1972-73 Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CES) and the 1977 federal income tax tables. Because these sources
refer to various years and use divergent definitions, a number of adjustments
wererequired.
The first step was to adapt the patterns of labor and capital income from
the 1979 Census data to the factor payments of the 1977 I/O tables. The latter
provides the total wage bill for each sector, but does not break this down
into the eight job/sex categories, nor indicate actual work hours. We applied
eachsector's 1979 wage bill distribution by job and sex to the 1977 totals;
andfor the eight wage rates needed to calculate work hours from these wage
69bills, we again took the pattern (i.e., the relative wages) from the Census,
scaled down by the 1977/1979 ratio of total labor income in the economy.
The resulting labor demands were summed over employers to obtain total
hours worked by men and women in each of the four jobs. While the total value
(at the scaled-down wages) of all 1979 work hours equaled the total value of
these labor demands, the distribution by job and sex did not completely match.
Therefore, we increased or decreased the population of each type of household
so as to provide the required labor supplies by job/sex category, while
maintaining the Census figures on the total work hours by a household of each
type, and the relative contribution of each household type to each labor
supply. These revised population figures were used in allocating the capital
income from the I/O tables, again maintaining the Census pattern of capital
ownership ratios between households of different types.
With factor incomes reconciled with the 1977 data, the next step was to
adjust the household expenditure figures. The federal income taxtableswere
consulted to estimate a simple linear tax function for each household type;
since the I/O government category includes state and local government, the tax
parameters had to be scaled up so that total tax revenues equaled total
governmentexpenditures. Each type of household was assumed to allocate its
after-tax income across the five production sectors in the value shares
observed for households of that type in the CES 1972-73 interview survey. (The
term 'consumption" in this model includes savings; the I/O investment column
was used to distribute savings wexpenditures.!)
Thepenultimate step was to scale up the I/O exportfigures to attain
tradebalance. Finally, the RAS procedure was applied to the inter-industry
transactions matrix to accommodate the revised levels of household consumption
andexports.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Agriculture 0.01/0.09 0.003/0.001 0.18/1.56 0.08/0.02
Goods 1.47/6.45 0.09/0.09 7.95/48.489.35/2.47
Trade 6 services 3.31/11.77 3.09/0.71 5.45/21.0221.80/4.35
Real estate 0.32/0.51 0.008/0.008 0.13/0.42 0.21/0.04
Govt. enterprises0.04/0.160.007/0.003 0.49/2.070.35/0.16
General govt. 2.35/4.09 4.98/1.86 1.67/7.02 6.76/1.62
——Totals 7.49/23.078.17/2.68 15.86/80.5638.54/8.67
Share of female
hours in total .245 .753 .165 .816
Female hourly wage $ 6.51 $6.60 $4.74 $4.23
Male hourly wage $10.72 $8.04 $7.21 $6.04
WE/tiM .606 .821 .658 .699
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